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Observations on the Insanity Defense and
Involuntary Civil Commitment in Europe
John Q. La Fond*
In May 1983, the author participated in an interdisciplinary
Law and Mental Health Delegation sponsored by the People-
to-People Foundation which visited England, Sweden, Hun-
gary, Switzerland, and France to examine, among other con-
cerns, how their legal systems structure the insanity defense
for mentally ill offenders and provide for involuntary civil
commitment of the mentally ill. The delegation consisted of
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, mental health
advocates, judges, and law professors from Canada and the
United States. The participants met intensively with psychia-
trists, psychologists, lawyers, government officials, members of
legislatures, professors, and judges in each of the countries,
and visited several major mental health facilities. This article
is based on presentations by, and discussions with, those
experts in their respective countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most societies are concerned with mental illness and, in
fact, formally take it into account in their legal systems in at
least two important ways. First, mental illness is generally con-
sidered a significant factor in assessing the criminal responsibil-
ity of persons charged with committing crime and in determin-
ing the proper disposition of mentally ill offenders.1 Second, the
state, in certain situations, will deprive the mentally ill of their
freedom and place them involuntarily in mental health facill-
* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law. B.A. 1965, LL.B.
1968, Yale University.
1. See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); H. FNGARE TE & A.
HASsE, MErAL DismnurrEs AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979).
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ties.2 Observing how selected countries in western and eastern
Europe take mental illness into account on these important
questions provides an invaluable opportunity not only to learn
how different societies solve common problems, but also to
determine if there might be better ways of addressing those
problems within our own society.
There are, of course, several perspectives from which one
could analyze the insanity defense and involuntary civil commit-
ment in foreign legal systems. However, the comparative per-
spective on which this article is based will focus on:
a) how foreign legal systems formulate and administer
the insanity defense;
b) how the power of the state is defined to civilly commit
mentally ill persons;
c) who makes the important decisions and when and how
they are made; and,
d) what happens to offenders who are considered men-
tally ill and to others who are considered mentally ill and
suitable for involuntary commitment.
II. THE UNITED STATES
In order to provide a basis of comparison and contrast, it is
useful to set forth very generally the manner in which our own
legal system addresses these problems.
A. The Insanity Defense
In the United States, most states make the defense of
insanity available to persons charged with criminal offenses.
There are two primary tests used to formulate the defense: the
M'Naghten test8 and the A.L.I. test." Both tests require that the
defendant must have been mentally ill at the time of the offense.
The M'Naghten defense is satisfied if, in addition to being
mentally ill at the time of the offense, the defendant did not
know the nature or quality of the act or that it was wrong. This
test focuses on the absence of cognitive ability as a result of
2. See La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commit-
ment, 30 BUFF. L. REV. 499 (1981).
3. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1849).
4. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
5. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1849).
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mental illness. It is premised on the notion that knowledge is
necessary for individual choice. Therefore, a mentally ill defend-
ant who did not possess requisite knowledge concerning his
behavior or its criminality is not a fit subject for retribution, nor
is his conduct deterrable by the threat of punishment.
The A.L.I. test also requires that the defendant be mentally
ill at the time of the alleged defense. In addition, it provides
that if, as a result of such illness, a defendant's capacity either
to know that his conduct was wrong or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired, he
may then be excused from criminal responsibility. This test per-
mits substantial impairment either in cognitive or volitional con-
trol to exculpate a criminal defendant. The philosophic premise
of this formulation is that a defendant who did not know, or
could not control himself even if he did know, did not choose to
do wrong.
Both tests require not only that an individual was mentally
ill at the time of the offense, but that the illness generated a
specific type of mental incapacity which indicated that a neces-
sary condition for personal responsibility was not present. Given
such psychological impairments, most purposes of punishment
would not be served by punishing this particular defendant.'
Since the presence or absence of mental illness is essential
to this inquiry into criminal responsibility, our system relies
heavily on the expert opinion of mental health specialists. In
most cases psychiatrists or psychologists will, at the request of
either the prosecution or the defense, evaluate the defendant
prior to trial, and at trial give their professional expert opinion
as to the mental health of the defendant at the time of the
crime. As with all crucial facts relevant to criminal responsibil-
ity, however, our adversarial, due process model of criminal jus-
tice leaves the task of ultimate fact-finding to the jury (or to the
judge in some cases). Thus, experts give their opinions before a
jury in a court of law where their testimony is subject to rigorous
confrontation and extensive cross-examination by legal counsel
for the government and for the defendant. Frequently, their
opinions are contradictory and manifest pronounced disagree-
ment among themselves.
6. See J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING (1970); H. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1964).
7. See Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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If a criminal defendant is found not guilty by reason of
insanity, he frequently is sent to a mental health institution for
further evaluation to ascertain whether he is still mentally ill
and dangerous.8 He may be released from such an institution by
the medical staff whenever it is determined that either of these
conditions no longer exist.9 Increasingly, though, the approval of
a court is also needed.10 Judicial review of continued confine-
ment in a mental health institution is almost always available to
such an individual."
B. Involuntary Civil Commitment
In the United States, a mentally ill person can be commit-
ted involuntarily under the police power12 or the parens patriae
power'" of the state. The police power permits the state to pro-
tect the public from harm. The parens patriae power authorizes
the state to protect and care for those persons incapable of tak-
ing care of themselves. In most state mental health systems,
qualified treatment personnel" can authorize involuntary admis-
8. Recently, there has been controversy in the United States over how long and on
what grounds a person acquitted by reason of insanity may be confined in a mental
health facility. Prior Supreme Court cases indicated that such a person could not be
confined beyond the maximum term for which he could have been sentenced unless, at
the end of such term, he was committed involuntarily under the state civil commitment
authority. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1972); Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107, 110 (1966). In a recent case, however, the Supreme Court held that, under certain
circumstances, a person acquitted by reason of insanity can be held beyond the maxi-
mum term for which he could have been sentenced without being subjected to substan-
tially the same standards and procedures used to commit persons being civilly commit-
ted. Jones v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 5041 (1983).
9. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-192 (West Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 5009 (Supp. 1983).
10. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-543(F) (West Supp. 1983); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1026.2 (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 330.20(12) (McKinney 1983).
11. See, e.g., Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
12. The state, as sovereign, has the authority to enact laws that will protect the
public health, safety, morals, and welfare. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 20 (1905). See La Fond, supra note 2, at 501-03; Developments in the Law, Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1223-25 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Developments-Civil Commitment].
13. The state is authorized under its parens patriae power to act on behalf of men-
tally ill persons who are incapable of protecting their own welfare. See La Fond, supra
note 2, at 504-06; Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 12, at 1207-22.
14. The term "mental health professional" is usually defined by statute and gener-
ally refers to any person with training in the field of human behavior who is authorized
to recommend or initiate involuntary civil commitment. It can include persons with a
wide range of competence and training in the mental health field. See, e.g., WASH. REv.
CODE § 71.05.020 (1981), which includes within its definition such diverse professionals
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sion of a mentally ill person to a mental health facility for evalu-
ation (and sometimes for treatment) for a relatively short period
of time. Within a reasonable time after such ex parte commit-
ment, an involuntary patient is entitled to rather expansive due
process protections, including representation by counsel and
judicial review of his confinement.15 Medical personnel may
release the committee whenever they determine he is no longer
subject to the state's commitment power, and courts can also
order release if they independently determine that confinement
is no longer justified. 6
III. THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND INVOLUNTARY CIVIL
COMMITMENT IN EUROPE
With the exception of Sweden,'7 all of the countries visited
provide an insanity defense to criminal defendants. All formula-
tions of the defense focus on whether the defendant was men-
tally ill at the time of the alleged offense, but they vary greatly
on what, if any, other elements are required for a defendant to
be considered legally insane. As will be seen, some countries
such as England"8 consider mental illness to be excusing only if
such illness results in specified psychological impairment.
Others, such as France, 9 seem to consider the mere presence of
mental illness a sufficient basis for excusing a defendant without
regard to specific incapacitating consequences of mental illness.
The countries also vary as to whether the insanity defense will
be adjudicated together with all other issues bearing on criminal
responsibility. For example, in England 0 the insanity defense is
adjudicated together with other factual issues. In other coun-
tries, such as Hungary,2' insanity is ascertained before issues of
guilt or innocence are resolved. When the latter approach is
used, criminal offenders, if found insane, are usually switched
as psychiatrists and persons holding a masters degree in social work.
15. See generally Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078, (E.D. Wisc.), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473, order reinstated on
remand, 379 F. Supp 1376 (E.D. Wisc. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wisc. 1976);
Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615, 328 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1972).
16. See, e.g., Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn. 1972).
17. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 24-25.
19. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
21. See infra text at section VI.A.
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out of the criminal justice system and into the mental health
system without substantial additional fact-finding in the crimi-
nal proceeding.
All five countries also have systems of involuntary civil com-
mitment. In each country, the state is empowered to confine per-
sons against their will in mental health facilities if they are men-
tally ill and either need treatment or pose a danger to
themselves or to others. The mental health systems observed
reflect a rather broad spectrum of substantive criteria which
control entry into, and release from, the systems. They range
from Switzerland's broad parens patriae power over persons
who are mentally ill and need treatment,2 to Hungary's empha-
sis on police power and the prevention of harm.2 3
In order to appreciate more fully the breadth and diversity
of approaches to the insanity defense and involuntary civil com-
mitment, it is useful to consider how each of the countries vis-
ited treats these issues.
IV. UNITED KINGDOM
A. The Insanity Defense
The United Kingdom is a common law realm that relies, in
theory, on the adversary system of fact-finding. As the progeni-
tor of the M'Naghten rule,24 English law retains the concept of
"not guilty by reason of insanity" and uses the M'Naghten test
as the applicable criteria of nonresponsibility. As a practical
matter, however, criminal defendants are simply not accorded
this defense. Very few defendants invoke the defense and, of
those who do, very few are successful.
There are several reasons for this phenomenon. First, the
prevailing attitude in both the medical and legal communities is
that mental illness is relevant not to an assessment of responsi-
bility but rather to the question of disposition. Consequently,
prosecutors and trial judges resist assertion of the insanity
defense quite vigorously. Even defense counsel, recognizing their
uphill struggle with the defense, often urge compromise through
guilty pleas. Second, defendants themselves usually prefer to
remain in the criminal justice system rather than be switched
22. See infra text at section VII.B.
23. See infra text at section VI.B.
24. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1849).
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into the mental health system via a verdict of "not guilty by
reason of insanity." In 1982, there were only three or four suc-
cessful insanity acquittals in England and Wales. This appears
to be an astonishingly small number.2 5
In England, mental illness can also be relevant to a finding
of guilt as a reductive matter. When England abolished capital
punishment in 1957, it imposed mandatory life sentences for
persons convicted of first degree murder.2 " As part of its statu-
tory reform of the criminal law, England also provided the par-
tial defense of "diminished responsibility" to persons charged
with first degree murder. Thus, mental illness is generally used
at trial as a partial defense to reduce a charge of first degree
homicide to manslaughter. It is seldom used as a complete
defense which will excuse a person altogether.
A convicted criminal defendant who is considered mentally
ill, although not legally insane, can be sent either to a prison or
to a hospital. If a person is sent to a mental health hospital, it is
usually for an indeterminate period. The court can and usually
does impose a "restriction order" on such a person if it considers
him dangerous. If a person is not subject to a restriction order,
the hospital staff can release a mentally ill offender when they
determine that he is safe enough to be in the community. If a
person is subject to a restriction order, however, the Home Sec-
retary27 must concur in the decision to release. Thus, the release
of a mentally ill offender from a psychiatric facility or from a
prison in England is usually a combined medical-political deci-
sion. Courts have virtually no control over the decision.
In reviewing British practice, some surprising observations
can be made. First, by effectively suppressing assertion of the
insanity defense and making mental illness relevant to place-
ment of the offender, the British system disregards the theory
and substance of its own law and adopts, instead, a pragmatic,
utilitarian approach to the problems posed by the mentally ill
offender. It is much less concerned with assessments of moral
blameworthiness and doing justice in the individual case, and
much more concerned with the appropriate disposition of the
25. In 1980 the estimated population of England and Wales was 49,244,300. 1 THE
EUROPA YEAR BOOK 1982, at 1311 (1982).
26. The Homicide Act, 1957 5, 6, Eliz. 2, ch. 11, § 2; Murder (Abolition of Death
Penalty) Act, 1965 ch. 71, § 1.
27. The Home Secretary is a cabinet officer in Great Britain with extensive respon-
sibilities over law enforcement functions.
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criminal offender. Second, it seems to emphasize as its primary
social objective the safety and security of the community and
minimizes the interests of the mentally ill offender in liberty and
an early return to the community. As a consequence, the role
played by courts and lawyers in the process is quite minimal
when compared to our system.
B. Involuntary Civil Commitment
A person can be civilly committed in England if he is men-
tally ill and either dangerous to others or in need of treatment.28
Commitment can be initiated either upon the recommendation
of two physicians or upon court order. A committee is entitled to
automatic, periodic review by an administrative tribunal 29 hav-
ing a mixed composition.30 A committee is not entitled to judi-
cial review of his continued confinement, and he seldom has
assistance of counsel in seeking his release. Release from a
mental health facility is invariably determined by the medical
staff. The staff also enjoys broad treatment authority over
patients.
Involuntary civil commitment in England is primarily an
administrative decision with substantial delegation of commit-
ment authority to medical personnel. There is quasi-indepen-
dent administrative review of the commitment on a regular
basis, but there is virtually no recourse to courts with the assis-
tance of counsel. The medical-administrative model provides the
basic architecture of the system. As a consequence, there is
extraordinary reliance on medical expertise with minimal con-
frontation or challenging of that expertise in an adversary, due
process decisionmaking scheme. Moreover, there is virtually no
legal assistance provided indigent committees who seek their
release from confinement in mental health institutions.
28. Thus, Britain permits involuntary civil commitment under either the police
power or the parens patriae authority of the state. See supra notes 12-13 and accompa-
nying text.
29. Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 73. Under this legislation a multidisciplinary
tribunal consisting of at least one judge, one psychiatrist, and a lay person will review
the appropriateness of continued commitment of every involuntary patient every six
months for the first year of commitment and annually thereafter. The tribunal has the
power to discharge all involuntary patients without obtaining the consent of the Secre-
tary of State. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
30. Before the new Mental Health Act, see supra note 29, a judge did not sit as a
member of the tribunal. It was composed primarily of staff members from the hospital.
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V. SWEDEN
A. The Insanity Defense
After extended legislative study, Sweden abolished the
insanity defense in 1965. Thus, there is no "impunity" defense
available to persons charged with criminal offenses in Sweden. 1
Instead, Sweden has passed unitary legislation which applies to
all mentally ill persons, including persons charged with commit-
ting criminal offenses and persons who may be subjected to
involuntary commitment.
If a person charged with a crime is suspected of having suf-
fered from mental illness at the time of the offense, the court
can order a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant in a public
health facility. 2 This examination, however, cannot be con-
ducted unless the prosecutor has proven that the defendant has
committed the criminal act or unless the defendant has con-
fessed to the act. At the public health facility, psychiatrists will
examine the defendant and submit in writing to the court their
opinion as to whether the defendant was suffering from mental
illness at the time of the offense. 3 Invariably, the court accepts
the opinion of the independent mental health experts concern-
ing the defendant's mental health at the time of the offense. The
defendant can appeal the court's finding to a national review
board.
If the court finds that the defendant committed the crimi-
nal act but was suffering from mental illness, the defendant is
31. For a comprehensive review of Sweden's treatment of the mentally ill offender
see Moyer, The Mentally Abnormal Offender in Sweden: An Overview and Comparison
with American Law, 22 AM. J. COMp. L. 71 (1974). Connecticut has abolished the
insanity defense. See, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West Supp. 1983-84). Several
other states have added "guilty but mentally ill" as an alternative verdict. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-1503 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 6-2, 113-4 to -5, 115-1 to -4, -6,
1005-2, -6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-3 (Burns Supp. 1983);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 504.130 (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (1982); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (Supp. 1983). See also Stelzner & Piatt, Guilty But Mentally Ill
Verdict and Plea in New Mexico, 13 N.M. L. REV. 99 (1983); Comment, Guilty But
Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. URB. L. 471 (1976); Note,
The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict and Due Process, 92 YALE L.J. 475 (1983).
32. For this purpose, there will be approximately 600 complete mental health evalu-
ations conducted annually in a mental health facility. (Statistical information provided
by Dr. Karl-Eric Torquist, forensic psychiatrist, in an address at Stockholm, Sweden on
May 20, 1983.)
33. Customarily, the experts do not appear in court to present their opinion, though
the court will occasionally request their presence. A typical report may run from 25-30
pages and may include reports of psychologists and social workers.
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found guilty but he cannot be sent to jail. Rather, the court is
limited to choosing from among the following dispositional alter-
natives: (1) confinement in a closed hospital; (2) probation; or,
(3) pecuniary penalties. If the court further finds, based on the
experts' opinion, that treatment is necessary or appropriate, it
can send the offender to a closed hospital for psychiatric treat-
ment. This commitment to a psychiatric facility is for an indefi-
nite period and the court does not determine when the mentally
ill offender will be released. That decision is exclusively a medi-
cal decision to be made by the medical staff. Usually two psychi-
atrists must agree that release is appropriate. A mentally ill
offender can appeal a negative release decision to a hospital
review board and, if unsuccessful, to a national review board.
B. Involuntary Civil Commitment
Sweden utilizes an administrative system of involuntary
civil commitment. Two physicians (one of whom is usually a
psychiatrist) can commit a person to a psychiatric facility if they
determine that a person is mentally ill and dangerous or needs
treatment or does not care for himself. Commitment is for an
indefinite period. Two physicians must also agree that the
patient can be released. Continued confinement is automatically
reviewed on a periodic basis by a hospital board and the patient
can also appeal to a national review board.
It should be noted that Sweden has one of the highest invol-
untary treatment rates in Europe. This should come as no sur-
prise, since the commitment criteria are very broad and the pro-
cess permits two experts to commit a person without any
judicial participation or review. On the other hand, the average
length of stay for mental patients has been diminishing substan-
tially in Sweden. 4
Sweden's legal system has some interesting features. In the-
ory, Sweden holds all criminal offenders responsible for their
antisocial acts; yet, many persons who commit serious crime are
sent to hospitals for psychiatric treatment rather than to prison
for punishment. The delegation of the coercive civil commitment
power of the state to experts is expansive and there is substan-
34. In 1960, the average length of stay for both voluntary and involuntary patients
was 290 days. In 1979, the average stay was 81 days. (Statistical information provided by
Dr. Ulf Brinck, psychologist, in an address at Stockholm, Sweden on May 20, 1983.)
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tial reliance on medical ethics rather than on the courts5 for
regulating the behavior of these experts. Independent medical
experts effectively make most of the crucial decisions concerning
mental illness, disposition, and release of criminal offenders and
committees with minimal judicial supervision or control and
without significant confrontation by the individuals involved.
VI. HUNGARY
A. The Insanity Defense
Hungary. provides criminal defendants with an insanity
defense. A defendant is not considered responsible for his con-
duct if he was mentally ill at the time of the offense and was
"unable to realize the consequence of his act or to proceed in
accordance with such realization.""5 Any participant in the pro-
ceeding can raise the insanity defense, including the police, the
judge, the prosecutor, or the defendant.3 7 If insanity is raised,
the criminal proceedings are held in abeyance while the court
orders an independent psychiatric examination. A lawyer will be
appointed for the defendant at this juncture. Two psychiatrists
35. Sweden also permits the Ombudsman, a special investigator, to investigate
patient complaints. Gellhorn, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 75 YALE L.J. 1, 20
(1965).
36. This formulation appears to focus both on cognitive and volitional capacity. See
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1849); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955); see also note 6 and accompanying text.
37. In the United States, jurisdictions have split on whether the trial court can
impose the insanity defense on a defendant who does not want it raised. Compare, e.g.,
State v. Jones, 99 Wash. 2d 735, 664 P.2d 1216 (1983) (en banc) (a trial court may rarely,
if ever, impose a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity over the objections of a defend-
ant who is competent to stand trial); State v. Dodd, 70 Wash. 2d 513, 424 P.2d 302, cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 948 (1967) (if a defendant has sufficient intelligence to rationally choose
whether to stand trial, plead guilty, or enter a plea of mental irresponsibility, the choice
is his, not that of his attorney, for Washington constitution [art. 1, § 22] gives him the
right to appeal and defend either in person or by counsel); Frendak v. United States, 408
A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979) (court held that the underlying philosophy of North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) mandates that
the defendant be permitted to make fundamental decisions about the course of proceed-
ings), with, e.g., State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 639, 564 P.2d 1154 (1977) overruled by
State v. Jones, 99 Wash. 2d 735, 664 P.2d 1216 (1983) (unanimous decision upholding
broad discretion of trial court to enter sua sponte the plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity in pursuit of justice); Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 862, reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 912 (1965) (leading case holding that in the
pursuit of justice, a trial judge must have the discretion to impose an unwanted defense
on a defendant and the consequent additional burden on the Government prosecutor,
because "if a man is insane in the eyes of the law, he is blameless in the eyes of society
and is not subject to punishment in the criminal courts").
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will evaluate the defendant and submit their opinion in writing
to the court. If the experts cannot agree, additional experts may
be requested to examine the defendant. If the judge disagrees
with the expert opinion, he may send the defendant to a legal-
medical committee for further evaluation. A defendant can also
request, but cannot demand, that another expert examine him.
Normally, the judge follows the recommendation of the experts.
If the defendant is found by the court to have been insane
at the time of the offense, the criminal proceedings are termi-
nated and the focus shifts to considering what disposition should
be made of the defendant. If the defendant is still mentally ill
and (1) the crime was one of violence against the person, or (2)
the crime created a public danger, or (3) the punishment for the
crime would have been confinement in prison for more than a
year, the defendant may be sent to a psychiatric hospital for
treatment. A violent offender may also be treated in a hospital
within a prison. Alternatively, a defendant may be released on
probation and treated as an out-patient. Commitment to an in-
patient psychiatric facility is for an indeterminate period.
Except for one hospital in Hungary, release from a psychiatric
facility is exclusively a medical decision to be made by the staff.
Release from this one other hospital requires approval of the
court.
Hungary also permits the defendant to use mental illness as
a reductive defense under the theory of diminished responsibil-
ity. Thus, mental illness is relevant to the presence or absence of
mens rea. This is similar to the United Kingdom's approach to
permitting a defendant to use mental illness to reduce a first
degree murder charge to manslaughter. 8
B. Involuntary Civil Commitment
A person may be involuntarily committed if he is mentally
ill and dangerous to himself or others. Any person can initiate
the process, including the family or neighbors of the individual.
Hungary permits the formal process in some cases to be initiated
by summons.39 If the individual does not respond to the sum-
mons by reporting to the mental health facility for an evalua-
38. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
39. Washington has recently struck down as unconstitutional a summons procedure
initiated by a mental health professional without prior judicial approval. See In re Har-
ris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982).
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tion, the mental health staff can visit the individual in his home.
Generally, two experts, usually psychiatrists, can commit a
person to a psychiatric facility for 8 days. A court supervises the
commitment and will review the patient's continued hospitaliza-
tion. A court may also decide that a guardian should be
appointed for the mentally ill person. Lawyers can assist
patients in seeking their release from psychiatric facilities, and a
court can appoint an attorney to assist an indigent.
The Hungarian experts who met with the delegation main-
tained that psychiatry is not used to stifle political dissent, as
western experts have alleged occurs with some frequency in the
Soviet Union.40 They assert that Hungary, because of the
destruction that occurred during World War II, lacks psychiatric
facilities. Consequently, there is an acute shortage of psychiatric
beds throughout the country.4 1 Therefore, the mental health sys-
tem emphasizes out-patient care whenever possible and seeks to
minimize the duration of patient stays in psychiatric
institutions.
Hungary's mental health system appears to be strikingly
similar to that of the United States. It provides both an insanity
defense and diminished responsibility defense, and emphasizes
the police power of the state in its involuntary commitment
scheme. Lawyers representing the individual seem to participate
significantly in the process, and courts appear to monitor the
process with some degree of vigilance. The emphasis on out-
patient treatment whenever possible parallels the "least restric-
tive alternative" philosophy that is strongly espoused in the
United States. 2 This theory requires the state to take no more
drastic measures than are necessary to accomplish the state's
purpose and, in many cases, might require the state to treat a
40. See, e.g., Comment, Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment: An International
Human Rights Issue, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 629 (1979); Reich, The World of Soviet Psy-
chiatry, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1983, § 6, at 20. For an interesting case history of a self-
proclaimed political offender in the United States, see Resnick, The Political Offender:
Forensic Psychiatric Considerations, 6 BULL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 388 (1978).
41. This raises an interesting question of "supply side" economics. Throughout the
countries visited, foreign hosts frequently observed that their experience indicates that
psychiatric beds in mental health facilities tend to be filled. They suggested that any
serious attempt to reduce involuntary civil commitment should begin by reducing the
number of psychiatric beds available in the mental health system.
42. See generally Chambers, Alternative to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972); Hoff-
man & Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally Ill: A Doctrine in Search of
Its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1100 (1977).
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mentally ill person on an out-patient basis or in a more open
mental health facility.
VII. SWITZERLAND
A. The Insanity Defense
Switzerland also provides persons charged with a crime with
an insanity defense. If a defendant was mentally ill at the time
of the offense and had no capacity to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law, he has a personal excuse which precludes his being pun-
ished for his conduct. This formulation of the insanity defense is
very similar to the A.L.I. test.4 3 If insanity is raised, the trial can
be stopped while a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant is
conducted.
The court will appoint an expert to examine the criminal
defendant. The expert usually submits his opinion to the court
in the form of a written report. A defendant can retain his own
expert to evaluate him, but the report of this expert is fre-
quently greeted with a fair degree of skepticism. If there is a
jury trial, the court appointed expert may have to testify in per-
son, and both the jury and the defendant's lawyer can ask him
questions. The judge invariably follows the opinion of its own
appointed expert, however.
If the defendant is found to have been insane at the time of
the offense, the defendant can be released outright or placed in a
prison or in a hospital. Release from confinement is usually a
medical decision which must generally be approved by an execu-
tive authority. A defendant can appeal a negative release deci-
sion but it is seldom done.
B. Involuntary Civil Commitment
A person can be involuntarily committed in Switzerland if
he is mentally ill and in need of treatment. Dangerousness to
self or to others is not a necessary condition for commitment.
Any single physician (not necessarily a psychiatrist) can commit
an individual to a mental health facility. No court order is
required. Within ten days after his commitment a patient can
appeal to a three-person tribunal consisting of a judge, a doctor,
and a third person. He can retain a lawyer for this review, but
43. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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none is appointed. If a doctor considers that a patient's health
might be endangered by his presence at the review proceeding,
he can order the patient excluded.
Switzerland's system of involuntary civil commitment is
extraordinarily inclusive. It is premised almost exclusively on a
pure medical model in that a determination by a single physi-
cian that a person suffers from mental illness subjects that indi-
vidual to the coercive power of the state. There appears to be
minimal judicial or political control over the system. Surpris-
ingly to foreign observers, there seems to be minimal discontent
with this model, or agitation for reform.
VIII. FRANCE
A. The Insanity Defense
France's insanity defense is of long standing origin. Article
64 of the French Penal Code provides simply that:
If the person charged with the commission of a felony or mis-
demeanor was then insane or acted by absolute necessity, no
offense has been committed."4
The criteria for legal insanity seems to be met if the defendant
was mentally ill at the time of the offense. No specific mental
impairment or incapacity must be established, nor must any
causal relationship between the mental illness and the behavior
be proven.
If insanity appears to be an issue, the court will appoint an
attorney as an officer of the court to conduct an inquiry into the
mental health of the defendant at the time of the offense. He
will prepare a file on the defendant for submission to the court.
In order to prepare this report, he will have the defendant
examined by experts, usually two forensic psychiatrists selected
from a court-approved list of recognized experts. A defendant
can request that he be examined by additional experts but he
cannot have his own expert examine him. The court-approved
experts, based on their evaluation of the defendant, form an
opinion of his sanity at the time of the offense. Psychiatric eval-
uations are done routinely in cases of the worst crime. The judge
is the final decision-maker, but he usually follows the recom-
mendation of the experts.
44. THE FRENCH PENAL CODE, Art. 64, (G. Mueller ed. 1976).
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If a defendant is found insane, he is evaluated further to
ascertain if he is presently mentally ill and dangerous. If he is
found mentally ill and dangerous, he is sent either to a prison or
to a hospital and he remains under the jurisdiction of the execu-
tive. Release is both a medical decision and a political decision
by an executive authority. A defendant can appeal a negative
release decision to a special judicial tribunal which can release
the defendant over the objection of the executive. This evidently
does not occur often.
B. Involuntary Civil Commitment
A person can be committed involuntarily if he is mentally ill
and dangerous or in need of care and treatment. The executive
(usually the police) frequently initiates a police power commit-
ment based on dangerousness while family or friends usually ini-
tiate commitment for care and treatment.
Any single doctor can sign a commitment certificate author-
izing coercive confinement of a patient for therapeutic purposes
within a psychiatric facility. Within 24 hours of commitment,
however, another certificate affirming the need for continued
confinement must be obtained from the physician in charge of
the facility. Commitment at this juncture is indeterminate,
although the patient can appeal (without the assistance of a law-
yer) his continued commitment to a special tribunal. The pre-
fect 46 can initially commit a person as mentally ill and danger-
ous to others. The medical staff of a mental health facility then
examines the patient and informs the prefect whether they con-
sider the patient to be mentally ill and dangerous. Usually, the
prefect follows the recommendation of the psychiatrists. Only
the prefect, however, has the authority to release such a person.
A negative release decision may be appealed to a special judicial
tribunal. Such executive commitment and release appears
unusual in Europe.
IX. CONCLUSION
Not surprisingly, most of the European legal systems
observed formally take mental illness into account in assessing
45. The prefect is the most important local official in the administration of France's
territories. Prefects perform numerous functions, including administration, execution of
policies, and decisions and coordination of the territory's civil servants. B. SCHWARTZ,
FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD 82-83 (1954).
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the criminal responsibility of mentally ill persons charged with
committing a criminal offense. With the exception of Sweden,
every criminal defendant is provided by law with an opportunity
to have the defense of insanity considered. Even more impor-
tantly, however, these legal systems consider mental illness cru-
cial in determining the proper disposition of a person charged
with committing a crime. Compared to the United States, they
seem generally less concerned with making accurate and individ-
ualized assessments of moral blameworthiness and more con-
cerned with ensuring that persons who have committed acts pro-
scribed by law will not commit other such acts in the future.
They are also more concerned that such persons are effectively
treated so as to achieve that objective.
All five countries also provide in their legal system for invol-
untary civil commitment of the mentally ill. Each state is
authorized to confine and treat mentally ill persons without
their consent in mental health facilities. The purposes of invol-
untary civil commitment range from the purely therapeutic-the
restoration of the patient's mental health-to the preven-
tive-the prevention of harm to the community or to the indi-
vidual. There the similarities to the United States stop and the
differences become quite sharp.
Viewed from a broad perspective, the mental health legal
systems observed in Europe are firmly grounded in the medical
model. Their legal systems delegate major decisionmaking on
questions of criminal responsibility, coercive confinement and
treatment in psychiatric institutions, and individual freedom to
medical experts. The underlying assumptions seem to include
confidence in the claimed expertise of the medical specialist and
confidence in this particularly quasi-scientific model of human
behavior. It should be noted that virtually every mental health
expert from the United States participating in the delegation
expressed intense discomfort with mental health specialists
being granted such broad and unchecked authority to make such
difficult and important decisions.
Compared to the United States, there is minimal recogni-
tion of the political, philosophic, and moral nature of these fun-
damental questions involving personal responsibility and indi-
vidual autonomy. Consequently, judicial monitoring of the
decisionmaking process in Europe appears minimal. The relative
absence of judicial participation in and control over how these
decisions are made in Europe may also be explained by our pref-
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erence in the United States for adversarial, due process decision-
making which encourages a dispute between the parties as to the
truth and surfaces disagreement among the experts. This is in
stark contrast to the continental model of inquisitorial truth-
seeking which frequently masks any disagreement among
experts.
In the selected European countries, there also appears to be
less emphasis on and concern with freedom of the individual and
his civil rights as important values. Clearly, the European sys-
tems observed manifested a strong preference for the state to act
effectively in preserving community safety, preventing harm,
and acting in the individual's assumed self-interest. Utilitarian-
ism and paternalism dominate in Europe. The intellectual and
political history of the United States, on the other hand, is much
more distrustful of such state action.
There also seems to be more confidence in Europe that the
government and, more importantly, its appointed experts are
properly discharging their responsibilities. The European
approach may actually allocate more of the available resources
to therapy and to the accomplishment of the substantive public
policy goals rather than consuming them in "inefficient," due
process decisionmaking. On the other hand, one is struck by the
somewhat cavalier attitude that mistakes are not a significant
problem and occur very infrequently in these European systems.
The mental health legal systems of these countries recall the
state of the law and practice in the United States in the 1950's.
In that era, medical experts had broad grants of authority from
the state which they exercised virtually without challenge, and
there was minimal political or judicial supervision exercised over
these experts. Lawyers were not significant actors in the process
because there were almost no "rights" recognized under our law.
Of course, the 1960's saw a virtual explosion in the United
States in social and legal concern about our law and mental
health system resulting in increased constitutional scrutiny of
this apparatus of social control. Courts, legislatures, and lawyers
have been involved intensely ever since. More recently, however,
the pendulum of public and legal opinion here seems to be
swinging back somewhat to the "hands off" attitudes observed
in Europe.
The European countries observed seem remarkably com-
fortable with their present systems and there appears to be min-
[Vol. 7:527
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imal agitation or pressure for change. Whether the pendulum of
public opinion will swing in Europe remains to be seen.
